
The Society of Legal Scholars
The Society of Legal Scholars seeks to advance legal science and legal
education, continuing a tradition in which legal studies have been centrally
included within university education since its earliest beginnings. Although
there have been periods in the past when university education in law became
moribund in one place or another, this branch of learning has never been
extinguished. Vitality in academic law can be confidently said to
characterise most of the many jurisdictions in which members of the SLS are
at work. They take pride in their role as representatives of the learned
tradition of humane scholarship.
It is common to divide the world of learning between the natural sciences
and the human and social sciences. Law occupies a central part in the
latter, sharing concerns with historical, literary and philosophical enquiry
as well as with politics, economics and social studies. The academic study
of law belongs among those branches of study which are essentially
interpretive. It concerns interpretation of the legal order of states, of
the European Community as a trans-statal body and of the international
community more generally. The common law as received in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland and the historically distinctive Scottish legal tradition
are fundamental parts of the cultural heritage of the British Isles. In the
Commonwealth and the United States, and in civilian jurisdictions,
distinctive developments of old traditions are not less foundational
culturally. Scholarly enquiry into the law and social scientific study of
its operations are everywhere fundamental to an understanding of modern
society.
A rounded education in law must always include a sound grounding in the
basics of legal doctrine: public law, both constitutional and criminal;
private law, concerning obligations, persons and property and at least some
elements of commercial law; also some elements of law in its trans- national
or international set- tings. It should also include, preferably through
special courses dedicated to this, elements of legal history and of the
philosophy and sociology of law. More important than the detail of any
particular curriculum is the spirit of a legal education defined by: rigour
and accuracy in the study and analysis of the texts of the law;
understanding of texts in the light of underlying principles and possible
theoretical approaches to their construction; critical appreciation of
problematic aspects of law; and a readiness to enquire into the contexts in
which law operates. Also, there should be a firm awareness of law's
character as a practical discipline; this includes an awareness of legal
practice and its requirements, but is not exhausted by that. In the broadest
sense it requires a grasp of law as a domain of practical reason.
The fate of constitutionalism and the Rule of Law is nowhere a matter for
complacency. Teachers of law protected by a justly defined academic freedom
and imbued with a proper sense of professional self-respect and civic
responsibility have a special role to play in maintaining critical awareness
of the preconditions for law and liberty. The part they play is scarcely
less vital than that of an independent judiciary and legal profession.
